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ABSTRACT
The news has been peppered with tragic stories of individuals with
disabilities who have been killed or injured following police
encounters. In the aftermath of these incidents, as injured parties seek
accountability, a question looms: Can arrest proceedings violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act?
The ADA was enacted to prohibit disability discrimination. The law
had an ambitious agenda, supported by broad statutory authority, to
ensure equality in all areas of public life for individuals with
disabilities. But while the ADA has fostered integration into many
aspects of modern life, one area remains deeply contested: arrests.
If Congress envisioned that Americans with disabilities would enjoy
lives free from discrimination, excluding arrests from ADA coverage
undermines the law’s broad promise of protection. In 2015, a Supreme
Court opinion raised but failed to resolve this very issue, leaving an
important question unanswered. This Note examines whether arrest
proceedings must comply with the ADA and argues that they should.
It then proposes comprehensive disability training as a tool to aid ADA
compliance and avoid discriminatory arrest proceedings.
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INTRODUCTION
Robert Ethan Saylor, a young man with Down syndrome, was
fascinated by police officers.1 He frequently called the local dispatcher,
eager to converse.2 In a tragic irony, Saylor died at the hands of the
very people he admired. On January 12, 2013, Saylor went to the
movies with his aide, Mary Crosby, but grew distressed as the two
prepared to leave.3 While Crosby went to get the car, Saylor sneaked
back to the theater for a second viewing.4 When Crosby came looking
for him, the theater manager demanded that Saylor buy a second ticket
or leave.5 Crosby told the manager that Saylor had Down syndrome
and asked that everyone keep their distance, as she was best equipped
to handle the situation.6 Disregarding her advice, three off-duty
deputies were dispatched to remove Saylor from the theater.7 He was
quietly sitting in his seat when they approached,8 but a struggle then
ensued. The officers tackled Saylor to the floor, fracturing his larynx in
the process.9 Saylor died from asphyxiation shortly thereafter.10 He was
twenty-six years old, with an IQ of forty, and presented features
associated with Down syndrome.11 Saylor’s family filed a lawsuit
including a claim for failure to train the police officers in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).12
Ethan Saylor’s story is devastatingly common: it is the story of
tragedy at the hands of law enforcement officers who fail to
appropriately engage individuals with disabilities in arrest
proceedings.13 Cases that address injurious arrests of individuals with

1. Theresa Vargas, Md. Man with Down Syndrome Who Died in Police Custody Loved
Law Enforcement, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-manwith-down-syndrome-who-died-in-police-custody-loved-law-enforcement/2013/02/19/10e09fe0-7
ad5-11e2-82e8-61a46c2cde3d_story.html [https://perma.cc/M6XQ-YM6F].
2. Id.
3. Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 413 (D. Md. 2014).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 414.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 413.
12. Id. at 414–15.
13. Recently, a behavioral therapist and caretaker to a man with autism was shot when police
officers responded to a call about a man allegedly threatening suicide. The officers drew their
guns and shot the caretaker despite him telling the police officers that the man he was looking
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disabilities generally draw on Title II of the ADA.14 But the circuits are
split on whether police officers’ actions should be exempt from ADA
coverage altogether, deferring to officers’ decisions in the face of
exigent circumstances.15 A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit, City
of San Francisco v. Sheehan,16 requires police officers to accommodate
an individual’s disability in an arrest proceeding despite a potential
exigency, accentuating the circuit split.
In August 2008, San Francisco police officers received a call from
a social worker at a group home requesting that they check on a
patient, Teresa Sheehan.17 Sheehan, who suffered from schizophrenia,
had been off her medication, and the group-home staff feared for her
safety.18 When the police approached Sheehan’s room, she threatened
them with a knife and insisted they leave her alone.19 Sheehan was shot
multiple times in her bedroom, but ultimately survived.20 She filed suit
against the city, claiming the police officers failed to reasonably
accommodate her disability in violation of the ADA.21 The Ninth
Circuit agreed and held that officers are obliged to reasonably
accommodate an individual’s disability in the course of an arrest.22 The
city appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari.23

after had autism and was holding a toy truck. See Niraj Chokshi, North Miami Police Officers
Shoot Man Aiding Patient with Autism, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/22/us/north-miami-police-officers-shoot-man-aiding-patient-with-autism.html [https://perma.
cc/KA38-DM47].
14. See, e.g., Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234–35 (M.D. Pa. 2003)
(recognizing the application of Title II of the ADA in a failure-to-train claim arising from an
arrest proceeding).
15. Compare id. (recognizing the application of Title II to police officers’ decisions), with
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II does not apply to an officer’s onthe-street responses to reported disturbances . . . .”), and De Boise v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d
892, 899 (8th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging the relevance of Title II but noting that the inquiries are
fact intensive and deference should be given to police discretion in exigent circumstances).
16. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
17. Id. at 1770.
18. Id. at 1769.
19. Id. at 1770–71.
20. Id. at 1771.
21. Id.
22. See Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1233 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part
and cert. dismissed in part by 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (denying judgment as a matter of law to the
city by noting that a reasonable jury could find that the city failed to reasonably accommodate
Sheehan and her disability).
23. Sheehan, 743 F.3d 1211, cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 13-1412).
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In its initial brief, the city argued that law enforcement activity in
the course of an arrest should be exempt from the ADA.24 But in
subsequent briefings and oral argument, the city agreed that the ADA
applies to arrests25 and shifted to a subsidiary question.26 Frustrated
with this pivot and consequently lacking sufficient information to issue
an opinion, the Court dismissed the question of arrests under the ADA
as improvidently granted.27 Before doing so, however, the Court
articulated an applicable analytic structure for such cases. Writing for
the majority, Justice Alito presented a two-pronged framework to
evaluate whether arrests are covered under the ADA: (1) Is an arrest
a public activity? and (2) Does the treatment an individual receives in
the course of an arrest constitute discrimination?28 Although unable to
provide an answer in this case, the Court recognized the importance of
the question.29 But as for Ethan Saylor and the nearly fifty-six million
Americans with a disability,30 the issue is not just important but
potentially a matter of life and death.
This Note applies the two-part framework from Sheehan to argue
that arrests are activities of a public entity and that the treatment some
individuals with disabilities receive in the course of such arrests can
constitute discrimination. Accordingly, arrests should be subject to the
protections afforded by Title II of the ADA. To ensure ADA
compliance, law enforcement officers should reasonably accommodate
an individual’s disability in the course of an arrest. Although courts
generally recognize Title II as the relevant statute in such situations,
24. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18–28, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct.
1765 (2015) (No. 13-1412) (establishing the argument that law enforcement activity in the course
of an arrest should be exempt from ADA compliance). The certiorari petition also included a
question on qualified immunity for the law enforcement officers involved in the Sheehan case. Id.
at 28–40.
25. It remains unknown why the petitioners in this case abandoned their primary argument.
Political reasons may have been at play, as San Francisco is a predominately liberal jurisdiction
and bringing an anti-civil rights lawsuit may have had negative political consequences for
accountable officials, but this is mere speculation.
26. See Brief for Respondent at 25–26, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765
(2015) (No. 13-1412) (noting that petitioners changed their argument from one categorically
excluding reasonable accommodations under the ADA to one focused on the specific exclusion
of Sheehan as an individual subject to the ADA because her dangerous behavior stripped her of
her status as a “qualified individual”).
27. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1773–74.
28. Id. at 1773.
29. Id. (describing the question of arrests under the ADA as an “important question that
would benefit from briefing and an adversary presentation”).
30. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010,
at 5 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XKK-EN7M].
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some are reluctant to provide redress under the ADA given the
dangerous nature of policing. But their reluctance fails to account for
the relevant regulatory guidance as well as the fact that disability
training occurs before an officer is on the scene, faced with potential
exigencies. Finally, this Note asserts that ADA compliance requires
that police officers receive comprehensive disability training. Such
training can help avoid discriminatory conduct by bridging the
communication gap, thus improving law enforcement officers’ abilities
to determine whether a perceived exigency presents a true threat or is
merely innocuous disability-related behavior.
With this in mind, Part I begins by providing additional
background on the ADA and thereafter illustrates the interactions
between law enforcement and individuals with disabilities. Part I also
describes how other courts have analyzed arrests under Title II of the
ADA. Before concluding, Part I examines Sheehan. Based on the
analytic structure provided by Sheehan, Part II analyzes how the ADA
applies to arrests. Part III explains why some courts have failed to
recognize discriminatory arrests under the ADA. Part IV advocates for
police officer training as a necessary ADA-compliance mechanism to
prevent discrimination and preserve the mandate of the law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of the ADA
Approximately one in five Americans has a disability.31 Within
that group, around 15.2 million adults have limited cognitive, mental,
or emotional functioning,32 and an estimated 1.2 million adults have a
diagnosed intellectual disability, such as Down syndrome.33 Thus, the
ADA protects a large group of Americans. It is a remedial statute
intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”34 Indeed, the ADA is unprecedented among civil rights

31. Id. at 4. The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012).
32. BRAULT, supra note 30, at 9.
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 413, 426 (1991) (noting that pervasive discrimination present in many areas of social life
presented “the factual underpinnings for the Americans with Disabilities Act”).
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statutes in the breadth of activities covered35 and enforcement capacity
granted to the Department of Justice (DOJ).36
Twenty-six years after its enactment, the disability community
continues to benefit from the ADA’s aggressive enforcement by both
the DOJ and private attorneys.37 Over this time period, the law has
proven flexible by incorporating technological advancements and
other aspects of modern life.38 The degree of protection afforded under
the ADA is due, in part, to a clear statutory purpose emphasizing an
intentional breadth of coverage.39 That individuals with disabilities
deserve equal access to all aspects of American life is a consistent
theme throughout the legislative history of the law,40 highlighting the
incongruity in allowing individuals with disabilities to integrate into
some, but not all, aspects of community life. Thus, if Congress
envisioned that Americans with disabilities would enjoy lives free from
discrimination, categorically excluding arrests undermines the ADA’s
broad promise of protection.

35. See Burgdorf, supra note 34, at 426.
36. See id. at 415 (“The ADA constitutes a second-generation civil rights statute that goes
beyond the ‘naked framework’ of earlier statutes and adds much flesh and refinement to
traditional nondiscrimination law.”).
37. See Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney Gen., Remarks at Justice Department
Event Commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act (July
23, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarksjustice-department-event-commemorating [https://perma.cc/2J6V-BG9X] (“I am proud to say
that the Department of Justice has been a leader in enforcing the ADA’s protections.”).
38. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., Enforcement Activities,
ADA.GOV: INFO. AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON THE AM. WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
http://www.ada.gov/enforce_activities.htm [https://perma.cc/C6PF-9STL] (providing information
about enforcement actions against Uber and Netflix, among others).
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(2)–(4) (2012) (“It is the purpose [of the ADA] . . . to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards . . . to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”); see also Burgdorf, supra note 34, at 453 (“The
Americans with Disabilities Act has the broadest scope of coverage of any single civil rights
measure enacted to date.”).
40. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
473 (“Separate-but-equal services do not accomplish this central goal and should be rejected.”);
id. at 49–50 reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 472–73 (“The purpose of [T]itle II is to continue
to break down barriers to the integrated participation of people with disabilities in all aspects of
community life.”).

RIFKIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/21/2016 11:18 AM

SUBJECTING ARRESTS TO ADA COVERAGE

919

Other civil rights statutes narrowly define discrimination,41 but the
ADA remains exceptionally broad, and intentionally so.42 Title II43 was
designed to eliminate discrimination by public entities.44 Congress
specified that Title II was enacted to extend the antidiscrimination
mandate of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “to all actions
of state and local governments.”45 But the troubling reality of police
encounters with the disability community undermines the ADA’s
purpose.
B. Setting the Stage: Law Enforcement, the Disability Community,
and the Title II Framework
Safe arrests depend on effective communication between law
enforcement and individuals suspected of wrongdoing.46 In fact, public
entities, like city governments and local police departments, are
already required to take steps to ensure effective communication with
individuals with disabilities.47 But unfortunately, miscommunication is
likely to occur,48 causing interactions to rapidly escalate and lead to

41. For an explanation of earlier civil rights statutes, see Burgdorf, supra note 34, at 426–29.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) (subjecting “any State or local government” to Title II
coverage).
43. Title I covers employment-related matters and Title III covers public accommodations
and services operated by private entities. Id. § 12111; Id. § 12181.
44. The antidiscrimination provision of Title II reads: “Subject to the provisions of this
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. § 12132.
45. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367. The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in many ways was the precursor to the ADA, but had a limited
application to programs receiving federal funding. The ADA extended this by imposing an
antidiscrimination mandate on all public entities, regardless of funding. See id. The House report
notes:
The first purpose [of the ADA] is to make applicable the prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of disability, currently set out in regulations implementing
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, to all programs, activities, and
services . . . . Currently, [section 504] prohibits discrimination only by recipients of
Federal financial assistance.
Id.
46. See Ellen C. Wertlieb, Individuals with Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System, 18
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 332, 334 (1991) (“Discrediting a person’s statements may lead to an
inappropriate arrest or the dismissal of a potentially dangerous situation.”).
47. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1) (2016).
48. See ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE? WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN PERSONS WITH
RETARDATION OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ENCOUNTER THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 15–23 (1991) (listing common communication characteristics that can lead to
misunderstanding).
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injury, humiliation, or even death.49 Researchers have found that
people with intellectual disabilities represent up to 10 percent of the
prison population, despite accounting for only 2–3 percent of the
general population.50 Furthermore, people with intellectual disabilities
have the highest risk of violent victimization.51 Thus, given the
frequency of interaction between law enforcement and individuals with
disabilities, the risk of discrimination and its harmful effects becomes
all the more real. Because “the officer . . . is the first point of contact
for citizens with disabilities who are arrested,” it is particularly
important to ensure police officers’ procedures are ADA compliant.52
Title II of the ADA provides a source of liability when public
entities and officials, such as police officers, engage in disability-based
discrimination.53 In so doing, the law incents proper antidiscriminatory
behavior in public arenas. Title II reads in part, “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.”54 A discrimination claim under Title II generally arises
when an individual with a disability is (1) excluded from a public
activity or (2) receives disparate benefits or treatment in the provision
of that activity.55 Anchored by this statutory framework, courts
addressing allegedly discriminatory arrests under Title II recognize two

49. See H. Richard Lamb, Linda E. Weinberger & Walter J. DeCuir, Jr., The Police and
Mental Health, 53 AM. PSYCH. SERV. 1266, 1267, 1270 (2002) (noting that miscommunication is
likely between individuals with disabilities and police officers and can lead to adverse results, such
as death).
50. LEIGH ANN DAVIS, PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: VICTIMS & SUSPECTS 1 (2009), http://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3664
[https://perma.cc/PA5D-MT3D]; see also id. at 2 (“[T]hese individuals are less likely to receive
probation or parole and tend to serve longer sentences . . . .”).
51. Id.
52. James K. McAfee & Stephanie L. Musso, Training Police Officers About Persons with
Disabilities: A 50-State Policy Analysis, 16 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 53, 53 (1995).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
54. Id.
55. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was denied the benefits of a program
or activity of a public entity which receives federal funds, and (3) he was discriminated against
based on his disability.” (footnote omitted) (citing Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 794(a)(1))).
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categories: wrongful arrests and arrests that fail to provide a reasonable
accommodation for the arrestee’s disability.56
Wrongful arrests occur when an individual is arrested for
noncriminal activity that is perceived as criminal because of innocuous
disability-related behavior.57 When police officers approached Charles
Lewis’s home to investigate a custody dispute, Lewis’s friends told the
officers that Lewis was deaf.58 They asked that the officers
communicate with Lewis through written questions.59 The officers,
however, issued verbal commands to Lewis and “proceeded to kick and
hit him” when he failed to respond.60 The officers were aware that
Lewis would be unable to hear verbal commands, but nonetheless
arrested him for criminal insubordination.61 Lacking the requisite
criminal intent, Lewis should never have been arrested.62 The officers
had reason to know Lewis would be unable to hear and comply with
any verbal commands, not because he was criminally insubordinate,
but because he was deaf.63
The second category results from a failure to reasonably
accommodate an individual’s disability, subjecting the individual to
injury, humiliation, or indignity that someone without a disability
would not face.64 A reasonable accommodation in the context of an
arrest is the modification of police procedures to accommodate the
individual’s disability.65 Jeffrey Gorman, a paraplegic, was kicked out
56. See, e.g., Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the two
different theories courts have used to analyze arrests under Title II as wrongful arrests and failure
to provide a reasonable accommodation); Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d
409, 425 (D. Md. 2014) (“Claims in the [arrest] context typically fall within two general
categories.”).
57. See Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220 (“[P]olice wrongly arrested someone with a disability
because they misperceived the effects of that disability as criminal activity.”).
58. Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175, 176 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 176–77.
62. See id. at 179 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because “[d]efendants have cited
to no evidence to contradict” the fact that they had no reason to arrest Lewis).
63. Id. at 176–77.
64. See Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220–21 (“[W]hile police properly investigated and
arrested a person with a disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, they failed to reasonably
accommodate the person’s disability . . . causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in
that process than other arrestees.”).
65. See id. at 1222 (discussing the theory that “Title II required [the city] to better train its
police officers to recognize reported disturbances that are likely to involve persons with mental
disabilities, and to investigate and arrest such persons in a manner reasonably accommodating
their disability”).
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of a bar in Kansas after the security guard banned his wheelchair from
the dance floor.66 Once outside the bar, Gorman angrily recounted the
story to nearby police officers, hoping they would help.67 The
interaction quickly escalated and Gorman was arrested for
trespassing.68 A van lacking proper wheelchair accommodations was
sent to transport Gorman to the police station.69 Police officers lifted
Gorman out of his wheelchair and fastened his torso to the seat of the
van using a seatbelt and his own belt.70 Unable to independently remain
upright when the makeshift safety measures came loose, Gorman fell
to the floor of the van.71 The injuries he sustained required corrective
surgery.72 In the course of the fall, Gorman’s urine bag was pierced,
leaving him drenched in a puddle of his bodily waste for the remainder
of the ride.73
This case is distinguishable from Lewis’s case. Here, the police
officers did have a legitimate reason to arrest Gorman. However, the
provision of a van unequipped to accommodate Gorman’s wheelchair
constituted the failure to reasonably accommodate him.74 As a result,
Gorman suffered substantial physical injury and humiliation that an
individual without a wheelchair would not have faced; therefore, the
arrest proceeding was discriminatory.75
These two examples illustrate the importance of ensuring ADAcompliant arrests. Although Title II is generally accepted as the
relevant statute,76 courts are split on whether to recognize
discriminatory arrests under the ADA.77 Given the perilous nature of
66. Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1998).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 910.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 913–14 (finding Gorman had a plausible ADA claim and remanding Gorman’s
case for factual development).
75. I am primarily using this fact pattern as an illustrative example. The court here found
that the discrimination claim was contingent upon additional facts. Id. at 916.
76. See Waller v. City of Danville, 515 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662–63 (W.D. Va. 2007) (recognizing
the general acceptance that Title II applies to police officers and their activities).
77. See Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] broad rule categorically
excluding arrests from the scope of Title II . . . is not the law.”); Gorman, 152 F.3d at 913
(recognizing that a claim for discriminatory arrests can exist under Title II of the ADA based on
legislative history, Supreme Court jurisprudence, and DOJ regulations). But see De Boise v. Taser
Int’l., Inc., 760 F.3d 892, 899 (8th Cir. 2014) (expressing a willingness to recognize a discrimination
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policing, the quick decisions required by police officers, and the duty
to protect the community at large, some circuits afford officers an
affirmative defense based on exigent circumstances, which limits the
success of ADA claims.78 In 2014, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a Ninth Circuit case, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan.79
The central question posed was whether law enforcement should be
required to reasonably accommodate an individual’s disability during
an arrest that presented a potentially exigent circumstance.80 However,
due to a “bait-and-switch”81 of arguments, the Court never issued an
opinion on the matter.
C. The Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity in Sheehan
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Teresa Sheehan plausibly claimed the
police officers violated the ADA when they made no modification to
their procedures in light of Sheehan’s disability, but instead defaulted
to deadly force.82 Although many courts are willing to accept that the
ADA may apply to arrests, some have carved out a broad exception
because “[t]he exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity
and the already onerous tasks of police on the scene go more to the
reasonableness of the requested ADA modification than whether the
ADA applies in the first instance.”83 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged
that Sheehan had a knife and was threatening to use it against the
police officers who entered her room.84 However, given Sheehan’s
qualifying disability, the court felt that the jury had sufficient
information to decide whether Sheehan was denied her right to a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA.85
claim but not a willingness to second-guess police officer discretion in exigent circumstances);
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We simply hold that [discriminatory arrest]
is not available under Title II under [exigent] circumstances . . . .”).
78. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (“[W]e hold that Title II does not apply to an officer’s onthe-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls
involve subjects with . . . disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that
there is no threat to human life.”).
79. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
80. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765
(2015) (No. 13-1412).
81. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1779 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part
and cert. dismissed in part by 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
83. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007).
84. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1230.
85. The court found that the jury could decide the officers should have “wait[ed] for backup
and . . . employ[ed] less confrontational tactics.” Id. at 1233.
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The City of San Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing
that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that law enforcement officers
must provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual with a
disability brandishing a knife during an arrest.86 But in what Justice
Scalia described as a “bait-and-switch,”87 the city accepted the premise
of the very question it challenged in subsequent adversarial briefings
and oral argument.88 The city acknowledged that law enforcement
officers should be obliged to accommodate an individual’s disability in
the course of an arrest, and argued instead that Sheehan was not
qualified for ADA coverage, given the “direct threat” she posed.89
Denied the opportunity to hear adversarial briefing, the Supreme
Court dismissed the question as improvidently granted.90 However, the
Court not only conveyed the importance of the issue but also
delineated an analytic structure.91 Bearing in mind the basic Title II
language introduced above,92 the Sheehan framework will seem
familiar.93 According to the Supreme Court, arrests are subject to Title
II if (1) “an arrest is an ‘activity’ in which the arrestee ‘participat[es]’
or from which the arrestee may ‘benefi[t]’”94 and (2) “the failure to
arrest an individual with a . . . disability in a manner that reasonably
accommodates that disability constitutes ‘discrimination.’”95 Although
we are left to speculate how the Court might decide the question, the
analysis must begin with statutory interpretation.

86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765
(2015) (No. 13-1412). The city also included an alternative argument alleging that, even if the
officers were found to have denied Sheehan her right to reasonable accommodation, the officers
should have been entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 28–29.
87. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1779 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 1772 (majority opinion) (“Having persuaded us to grant certiorari, San Francisco
chose to rely on a different argument than what it pressed below.”).
89. Id. at 1773.
90. Id. at 1774.
91. See id. at 1773 (discussing the analysis necessary to conclude that language in the ADA
applies to arrests of qualified individuals with disabilities).
92. For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.
93. I am accepting, rather than challenging, the structure of the Sheehan framework because
it mirrors all Title II analyses.
94. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1773 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012)).
95. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132).
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II. HOW THE ADA TREATS ARRESTS: AN EXERCISE IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
This Part conducts the analysis that the Supreme Court suggested
in Sheehan by considering: (1) whether an arrest can be categorized as
an activity96 in which the arrestee participates and benefits and (2)
whether failing to reasonably accommodate an individual’s disability
in the course of an arrest constitutes illegal discrimination under the
ADA. Based on the ordinary meaning of “activity,” regulations
interpreting Title II coverage, and other Supreme Court cases, an
arrest qualifies as an activity, and the failure to reasonably
accommodate an individual’s disability can result in illegal
discrimination.
A. Arrests as an “Activity” Under Title II
As with all questions of statutory interpretation, analysis begins
with the text of the statute.97 Title II states, in part, “[N]o qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services,
programs, or activities of a public entity . . . .”98 Although the law
defines a public entity,99 it fails to define a public service, program, or
activity. Sifting through these three possibilities, Justice Alito made a
nonbinding yet helpful suggestion that arrests should be characterized
as an “activity.”100

96. The word “activity” is used throughout this Note because that is how Justice Alito
categorized arrests in Sheehan. Id. (“[Title II] would apply if an arrest is an ‘activity’ . . . .”).
However, Title II would also cover arrests if arrests were categorized as a public service or
program. For consistency, arrests are referred to as an activity.
97. E.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144–45 (1995).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA defines a qualified individual as one who, “with
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs
or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2). In other words, a person must, with or
without a disability, be eligible to receive the benefits of the public program, service, or activity.
99. Public entities are defined, in part, as “any department, agency, special purpose district,
or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” Id. § 12131(1)B). There is no
disagreement that a police force is a public entity under the statute. See Waller v. City of Danville,
515 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662–63 (W.D. Va. 2007) (“Courts have liberally interpreted [public
entity] . . . to include . . . local police forces.”), aff’d, Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. Danville, 556
F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2009).
100. See Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1773.
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According to a common canon of statutory interpretation, a word
in a statute “must be given its ‘ordinary or natural meaning.’”101 The
Oxford English Dictionary defines “activity” as “the quality or
condition of being an agent or of performing an action or
operation.”102Additionally, Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines
activity as “an organizational unit or the function it performs.”103 Thus,
while the definition of “activity” incorporates many endeavors, an
arrest clearly fits within the ordinary dictionary meaning. Police
officers are public agents and an arrest is an action taken by these
agents to achieve the aim of public safety. Additionally, an arrest is a
function performed by an organizational unit, the police department.
To the extent that ambiguity remains as to the ordinary meaning of
“activity,” interpretive regulations provide additional gap filling.104
Congress granted explicit statutory authority to the DOJ to
“promulgate regulations . . . that implement [Title II].”105 The
regulations to Title II nearly mirror the statutory text106 and are granted
substantial judicial deference.107 The regulatory language sweeps in
everything a public entity does, regardless of whether the activity is
funded with federal dollars.108 However, the regulatory language goes
on to provide some necessary guidance by delineating two categories
of activities subject to Title II:
[T]hose involving general public contact as part of ongoing operations
of the entity and those directly administered by the entities for
program beneficiaries and participants. Activities in the first category
include communication with the public (telephone contacts, office

101. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 US. 223, 228 (1993)).
102. Activity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 2a (3d. ed. 2010), http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/1958?redirectedFrom=activity#ied [https://perma.cc/5JFL-V9EZ].
103. Activity, WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 20 (2d ed. 2001).
104. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2012). Furthermore, when Congress explicitly grants an agency
interpretive authority, the agency’s regulations are granted deference unless they are found to be
“arbitrary, capricious, or . . . contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
106. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2016) (“[T]his part applies to all services, programs, and
activities provided or made available by public entities.”).
107. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[R]egulations which the
Department promulgated [under Title II] are entitled to substantial deference.”).
108. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (“[Title II] applies to all . . . activities provided or made
available by public entities.”); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.102, at 677 (“Title II coverage,
however, is not limited to ‘[e]xecutive’ agencies [as is the Rehabilitation Act], but includes
activities of the legislative and judicial branches of State and local governments.”).
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walk-ins, or interviews) and the public’s use of the entity’s facilities.
Activities in the second category include programs that provide State
or local government services or benefits.109

An arrest likely qualifies under either of the categories. An arrest can
be part of a public entity’s ongoing operations under the first category,
or can be a program that provides “local government services”110 under
the second category.
It may seem unconventional to categorize arrests as an activity
that benefits an individual. Generally we do not assume the individual
arrested conceives of him- or herself as a beneficiary, nor do we assume
the individual volunteered for the arrest. In fact, some courts have held
arrests and law enforcement activity exempt from the ADA for this
very reason, finding that an individual held against his or her will
cannot be said to have participated in the activity voluntarily.111 The
analysis of these courts, however, overlooks the fact that nothing in the
language of the statute requires voluntariness. The Supreme Court
explicitly recognized this principle in Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey.112
An individual with a disability is qualified under Title II when he
or she is eligible to participate in and benefit from a public activity,
regardless of the impact of the disability.113 The statute, however, says
nothing about the voluntariness of the individual’s participation. Based
on the ordinary meaning of “eligibility” and “participation,” in Yeskey,
the Supreme Court concluded that eligibility for Title II does not
require an individual to participate voluntarily in “programs, services,
and activities.”114 In Yeskey, an inmate in a state correctional facility,
who met all the requirements to enroll in a diversion program for firsttime offenders, was denied participation in the program, and
consequently its benefits, because of his disability.115 Justice Scalia
noted that public entities offer many activities in which participation is

109. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.102, at 677.
110. Id.
111. See Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The terms ‘eligible’ and
‘participate’ imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who seeks a benefit from the state;
they do not bring to mind [individuals] who are being held against their will.”).
112. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012) (“‘[Q]ualified individual with a disability’ means an
individual with a disability who . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”).
114. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211.
115. Id. at 206.
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mandatory, refuting the claim that one must submit voluntarily to a
program.116 Reading in a voluntary participation requirement for
arrests would be contrary to the statute’s language.
Nor can it be said that an arrested individual receives no benefit
from the arrest. Sheehan itself illustrates this point. Home workers
called the police out of concern that Sheehan might hurt herself. The
police officers were called to protect Sheehan and help ensure her
safety, a benefit that she could have received had the arrest been ADA
compliant.117 But because the officers failed to modify their tactics in
light of her disability, she suffered substantial injury.118 Thus, arrest
proceedings do provide a benefit when they are conducted
appropriately. An arrest proceeding that results in an unequal benefit
because of one’s disability constitutes discrimination under the ADA,
as analyzed in the next Section.
B. Discriminatory Arrests Under Title II
Title II not only addresses the scope of the ADA’s application to
public entities, but also mandates that public entities provide benefits
and conduct activities in a nondiscriminatory manner. Title II states,
“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall . . . be subjected to
discrimination by [public] entit[ies].”119 Although the statutory text
does not define discrimination, the ADA’s other provisions, statutory
purpose, interpretive regulations, and legislative history provide
instructive insight into the meaning of discrimination under Title II.
Taken together, discrimination under Title II occurs when an
individual with disabilities receives an unequal benefit from an activity
because of his or her disability.120 Discrimination often results when
public entities fail to modify policies and procedures in a manner that
would reasonably accommodate the individual’s disability, leading to a
distinct injury.121

116. Id. at 211 (“A drug addict convicted of drug possession, for example, might, as part of his
sentence, be required to participate in a drug treatment program for which only addicts are
‘eligible.’”).
117. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1768 (2015).
118. See id. at 1767 (“[T]he officers shot Sheehan multiple times.”).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
120. See, e.g., Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying the standard).
121. See, e.g., Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236 (M.D. Pa. 2003)
(recognizing that modification of policies and procedures can effectuate the ADA’s
antidiscrimination mandate).
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Although Title II does not define discrimination, Titles I and III
make clear that discrimination constitutes the receipt of different
benefits because of a disability.122 Title I prohibits employment-based
disability discrimination.123 The antidiscrimination mandate in Title I
includes “denying equal . . . benefits to a qualified individual because
of the known disability.”124 Title III prohibits discrimination in public
accommodations.125 Like Title I, Title III’s antidiscrimination mandate
focuses on unequal benefits or opportunities, reading in part, “[I]t shall
be discriminatory to afford an individual . . . the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from a [program] that is not equal to that
afforded to other individuals.”126 Thus, under both Titles I and III,
disparate treatment through the provision of unequal benefits because
of one’s disability constitutes illegal discrimination; and so it does
under Title II.127
If discrimination is the injury, a reasonable accommodation is the
envisioned prevention mechanism. Notwithstanding the absence of
similar language in Title II, Titles I and III provide for reasonable
accommodation as the primary mechanism to avoid discrimination.
Under Title I, discrimination results when a group fails to “mak[e]
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.”128
Like Title I, Title III uses “reasonable modifications” as a tool to avoid
discrimination.129 Under Title III, discrimination results from a “failure
to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to . . . accommodate[]

122. When the same word is used in different parts of a statute, we can infer that the word
carries a similar meaning throughout the statute. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143
(1994) (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way
each time it appears.”).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
124. Id. § 12112(b)(4).
125. Id. § 12182.
126. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).
127. In fact, courts have found the provision of unequal benefits to constitute a violation of
Title II. See, e.g., Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 231 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding petitioners
had a valid claim under the antidiscrimination clause of Title II of the ADA as they were denied
the benefits of the city’s sidewalks).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
129. Although Title I uses the phrase “reasonable accommodation” and Title III uses
“reasonable modification,” many courts use these words and standards interchangeably. See
Johnson v. Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the parallel language
in Titles I and III lends itself to using the two interchangeably for analysis purposes).

RIFKIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

930

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/21/2016 11:18 AM

[Vol. 66:913

individuals with disabilities.”130 Therefore, in both titles, the provision
of reasonable accommodations is necessary to ensure equal benefits,
thus avoiding illegal discrimination. Courts have also required
reasonable accommodations under Title II to prevent discrimination.131
It may seem peculiar that Titles I and III set out the law more
precisely than Title II. But Titles I and III were entirely new provisions
under the ADA, while Title II extended an already-existing law.132
Because of this, Congress did not draft similar language for Title II.
Congress intended Title II to be interpreted in accordance with Titles
I and III and remain equally broad. Legislative history supports133 this
assertion: “Title II should be read to incorporate provisions of Titles I
and III” that are otherwise consistent with Title II.134 As one
congressional report notes, “[T]he committee has chosen not to list all
types of actions that would constitute discrimination because [T]itle II
extends the anti-discrimination prohibition of Section 504 [of the
Rehabilitation Act] to all actions of state and local government.”135
In addition, the overall statutory purpose of the ADA supports a
clear and comprehensive antidiscrimination mandate that can be easily
implemented:
It is the purpose of [the ADA] (1) to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination . . . (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a
central role in enforce[ment] . . . and (4) to invoke the sweep of
congressional authority . . . to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.136

To carry out this general purpose of eliminating discrimination through
effective enforcement, Congress enacted Title II to eliminate
disability-based discrimination in all aspects of public community

130. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
131. See, e.g., Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 276 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that, under
Title II, “the demonstration that a disability makes it difficult for a plaintiff to access benefits that
are available to both those with and without disabilities is sufficient to sustain a claim for a
reasonable accommodation”).
132. See Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (explaining
that Title II expands the Rehabilitation Act’s antidiscrimination provision found in Section 504).
133. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 474.
134. Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 475.
135. Id., pt. 2, at 84, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1)–(4).
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life.137 Congress recognized the plethora of settings in which
discrimination may arise and was aware that eliminating discrimination
would be burdensome but necessary.138 Ensuring the receipt of equal
benefits in all public activities, including arrests, fits squarely within the
larger statutory scheme. In fact, Congress intended that reasonable
accommodations be used to avoid discrimination in Title II.139
The ADA regulations provide an additional source of support.140
A public entity is prohibited from “provid[ing an activity] that is not as
effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result [or]
to gain the same benefit . . . as that provided to others. . . .”141
Additionally, “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.”142 This language
aligns Title II with Titles I and III. First, the regulatory definition of
discrimination nearly mirrors the statutory definitions articulated in
Titles I and III. Second, similarly to Titles I and III, the regulatory
language incorporates reasonable accommodation as a tool to help
avoid discrimination.
A discriminatory arrest occurs when an individual with a disability
receives a different benefit from an arrest than one without a disability
would receive.143 In an arrest proceeding, the benefit sought is a safe
and appropriate arrest.144 Thus, to avoid discrimination, law
enforcement officers are required to modify their customary arrest
proceedings in a manner that reasonably accommodates the
individual’s disability. When an individual’s disability is not considered
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 49–50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
472–73 (“The purpose of [T]itle II is to continue to break down barriers to the integrated
participation of people with disabilities in all aspects of community life.”).
138. Id. at 50, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473 (“While the integration of people with
disabilities will sometimes involve substantial short-term burdens . . . the long-range effects of
integration will benefit society as a whole.”).
139. Id. (“The provision of reasonable accommodation is central to [Title II’s]
nondiscrimination mandate.”).
140. For a Chevron analysis of Title II’s enforcement and interpretive regulations, see supra
notes 97–110 and accompanying text.
141. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii) (2016).
142. Id. § 35.130(b)(7).
143. To clarify, during an arrest, individuals with disabilities should, when necessary, receive
different treatment than individuals without disabilities. Police officers should modify standard
policies to accommodate the individual’s disability. In so doing, the individual will receive the
same benefit as someone without a disability: a safe and appropriate arrest.
144. For illustrative examples of the different treatment individuals with disabilities are
subject to, see supra Part I.B.
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and accommodated, that individual is likely to receive a benefit that
differs greatly from someone without a disability, thus constituting
discrimination. Other provisions of the ADA, the overall statutory
purpose, interpretive regulations, and legislative history all support
such an interpretation.
Some courts arrive at a similar conclusion.145 Others, however,
reject the application of Title II to arrests because of the potential risk
to public safety should officers be required to pause and consider a
disability.146 Although public safety is rightly a chief concern, the next
Part will explain why these courts have mistakenly emphasized this and
consequently misconstrued the ADA’s mandate.
III. ACCOMPLISHING THE ADA’S GOALS WITHOUT RISKING
PUBLIC SAFETY
In reviewing arrests gone wrong and subsequent ADA-violation
claims, some courts have expressed concern that requiring a police
officer to pause and reasonably accommodate a disability will threaten
public safety.147 Consider the facts in Sheehan.148 Police officers were
called to intervene when Sheehan, who has schizophrenia and was off
her medication, had a knife and was threatening to use it. The police
officers had to make a quick decision about how to most effectively
protect everyone involved. According to some circuits, obliging
officers to pause and contemplate a reasonable accommodation could
risk public safety, and is therefore not required.149 But what these
courts fail to recognize is that the ADA still applies regardless of an
exigency. Rather than strip injured parties of their rights under the
ADA, courts should analyze exigent circumstances as a direct-threat
affirmative defense to an ADA violation. In fact, the petitioners in
Sheehan amended their argument in this precise fashion.

145. See, e.g., Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (“The
legislative history of the ADA provides additional support for a broad interpretation
encompassing [arrests under the ADA].”).
146. See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II does not apply to an
officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances . . . .”)
147. See id. (“To require the officers to factor in whether their actions are going to comply
with the ADA, in the presence of exigent circumstances and prior to securing the safety of
themselves, other officers, and any nearby civilians, would pose an unnecessary risk to
innocents.”).
148. For a review of the facts in Sheehan, see supra Part I.C.
149. For examples, see supra note 15.
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Title I and Title III of the ADA stipulate that an otherwise
qualified individual will be exempt from ADA coverage when the
individual poses a “direct threat to the health or safety of others.”150
Title II does not include this exemption in the text of the law.151
However, the DOJ’s interpretive regulations once again align Title II
with Titles I and III.152 “This part does not require a public entity to
permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the services,
programs, or activities of that public entity when that individual poses
a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”153 The regulation
thereafter guides courts and public entities by clarifying that a directthreat affirmative defense claim under Title II requires an
individualized assessment:
[A] public entity must make an individualized assessment . . . that
relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective
evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk;
the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and
whether reasonable modifications . . . will mitigate the risk.154

Taken together, these regulations address the concern of reluctant
courts. When an individual truly poses a direct threat to others, police
officers are relieved from their duty to comply with the ADA because
the individual is no longer qualified under the ADA. But the
regulation’s main contribution is in recognizing that an accurate directthreat analysis is contingent on an individualized assessment.155
Enabling police officers to make such assessments necessitates
comprehensive disability training.156 Sheehan’s story illustrates the
importance of training in making an individualized direct-threat
assessment.

150. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2012); see also id. § 12113(b) (“The term ‘qualification
standards’ may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”).
151. For a discussion of why Title II often lacks the detail of Titles I and III, see supra notes
129–35 and accompanying text.
152. For a Chevron analysis of Title II’s interpretive and enforcement regulations, see supra
notes 97–110 and accompanying text.
153. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. See id. (“In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety
of others, a public entity must make an individualized assessment.”).
156. This notion is supported by regulatory guidance and legislative history, discussed infra
Part IV.
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When the City of San Francisco amended its brief in Sheehan, its
argument shifted away from arrests under the ADA generally to
Sheehan herself, arguing that she posed a direct threat.157 Rather than
argue that the ADA did not apply because of the exigency, the city
claimed an affirmative defense that there was no duty to reasonably
accommodate Sheehan because she was a direct threat to the officers
and her community.158 While claiming the individual presented a direct
threat is a valid affirmative defense, the city’s application was flawed.
The San Francisco police officers failed to assess the true risk Sheehan
posed and thus did not consider whether she could be reasonably
accommodated by a change in procedure, as required by law.
The officers were uniquely situated to make a thoughtful
individual assessment of Sheehan’s needs. They were in a group home
with staff who knew about Sheehan’s disability.159 Thus, the officers
had resources readily available to assess the level of risk Sheehan posed
and to determine whether a modification could be made that would
accommodate her disability.160 An expert in Sheehan’s case suggested
a few appropriate accommodations: respecting her comfort zone, using
calm and concise communication, and allowing the passage of time to
diminish the risk.161 Nothing, however, indicates that the officers
conducted an individualized assessment as required by law.162 The
officers had an opportunity to modify their procedures in a way that
would have ensured Sheehan’s safety. Doing so would have not only
prevented Sheehan’s injuries, but also protected the officers from legal
recourse.
Courts that focus on exigencies as a barrier to ADA compliance
also overlook the timing of events. Police officers receive training far
before an exigency presents itself.163 In Ethan Saylor’s case, the failure

157. See City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772–73 (2015) (noting that
petitioners shifted to analyze whether Sheehan was herself a qualified individual given the
potential exigency).
158. Id. at 1773.
159. Id. at 1767.
160. See Brief for Respondent, at 40–42, City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 131412).
161. Id. at 37.
162. Id. at 40; see Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1768 (stating the officers did not consider “if they
could accommodate [Sheehan’s] disability”).
163. See Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (“The
alleged non-compliance with the training requirements of the ADA did not occur the day that the
officers shot Ryan Schorr; it occurred well before that day . . . .”).
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to train occurred well before the officers encountered him.164 At the
time of the encounter, however, the officers’ behavior evidenced an
absence of disability training. Had the officers received comprehensive
disability training, they may have implemented a different course of
action; perhaps they never would have approached Saylor to begin
with, heeding his aide’s advice.
Training is a necessary mechanism to effectuate the purpose of the
ADA. Comprehensive disability training helps protect police officers,
the community, and individuals with disabilities by ensuring police
officers will be less likely to conflate exigent circumstances with
ordinary symptoms of a disability. Officers can thereafter modify their
policies and procedures in a manner that best accommodates the
individual’s particular needs.165
IV. POLICE OFFICER TRAINING AS AN ADA-COMPLIANCE
MECHANISM
In my experience, officers who can recognize and delineate disabilities
become ambassadors. Once their awareness is raised, they are
amazingly helpful in avoiding inappropriate arrests.166

When off-duty deputies charged into the theater where Saylor was
watching a movie, they had reason to know of his disability. Not only
is Down syndrome facially recognizable, but his aide verbally informed
them of his disability. Despite knowledge of the disability, the deputies’
actions evidenced a lack of awareness of how to interact with an
individual with Down syndrome. Had they been trained to understand
the complexities of Down syndrome, Saylor might still be alive today.
This Part analyzes the statutory and legal support for requiring
comprehensive disability training, thereafter discussing the prevalence
and substance of existing training programs. This Part concludes by
introducing a model for disability training enacted by the Maryland
legislature in honor of Ethan Saylor.

164. See Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 426 (D. Md. 2014)
(discussing plaintiffs’ Title II argument that the failure to train was based on a right to have law
enforcement equipped to interact with members of the disabled community).
165. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
166. Dolores Norley, Defendants with Retardation: Quintessential Cast-offs, Keynote
Address at Developmentally Disabled Offender Program (June 4, 1986), in PERSKE, supra note
48, at 25.
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A. Statutory and Legal Support for Comprehensive Disability
Training
Courts, Congress, and the DOJ have recognized that disability
training is necessary to defend the ADA’s antidiscrimination mandate.
Courts recognize the logic in police officer training as an ADAcompliance mechanism.167 Ryan Schorr was hospitalized when his
bipolar disorder spiraled out of control.168 But Schorr escaped from the
facility.169 Schorr’s parents enlisted local police officers to help their son
and asked that they bring him back to the hospital.170 However, a
violent confrontation transpired at Schorr’s apartment in which he was
shot and killed.171 Schorr’s parents thereafter brought a claim against
the police commission alleging that the absence of disability training
proximately caused their son’s death.172 The court agreed: “[The police
commission] failed to institute policies to accommodate disabled
individuals . . . by giving the officers the tools and resources to handle
the situation peacefully.”173 The Tenth Circuit also recognized the logic
inherent in such a claim: “[Plaintiff] might have argued that Title II
required Colorado Springs to better train its police officers to
recognize reported disturbances that are likely to involve persons with
mental disabilities, and to investigate and arrest such persons in a
manner reasonably accommodating their disability.”174
That a training manual on disabilities exists, however, is
insufficient for ADA compliance. The court in Saylor acknowledged
that effective ADA training must actually aid the officers’ interaction
167. See, e.g., Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (M.D. Pa. 2003)
(concluding that Congress’s broad policy mandate to eliminate discrimination must necessarily
include training of police officers). But see Waller v. City of Danville, 515 F. Supp. 2d 659, 665
(W.D. Va. 2007) (“The act or omission involved in failing to train police officers to deal with
mentally ill individuals may have a disparate impact on such individuals as a class, but can never
by itself equate to a specific act of intentional discrimination against a particular plaintiff.”), aff’d,
Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2009). The decision
in Waller v. City of Danville was appealed to the Fourth Circuit, but the Fourth Circuit punted on
the question of training. Waller, 556 F.3d at 177. The court’s analysis in Waller, however, was
flawed as it applied standards for a failure-to-train claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than failure
to train under the ADA. See id. at 177 n.3 (using a Supreme Court case on § 1983 liability to find
no grounds for a failure-to-train claim under the ADA).
168. Schorr, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 234.
173. Id. at 238.
174. Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 1999).
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with the person.175 In Saylor, the defendants attempted to introduce the
sheriff’s department’s general order regarding the “Investigation of
Persons with Mental Illness”176 as factual evidence of disability-related
training material.177 But the court suggested that it would take more
than a paper document to satisfy the ADA’s training requirement.178
To suffice, training must actually enable officers to modify their
procedures to best accommodate the individual’s disability.179
Legislative history also supports police officer training as an
ADA-compliance mechanism. Recognizing Title II’s broad obligation
to eliminate disability discrimination in public arenas, the House
Judiciary Committee noted:
In order to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it is often
necessary to provide training to public employees about disability.
For example, persons who have . . . a variety of other disabilities, are
frequently inappropriately arrested . . . because police officers have
not received proper training . . . . Such discriminatory treatment based
on disability can be avoided by proper training.180

The regulations provide additional support. In redrafting Title II
regulations, commentators requested that mandatory police officer
training be included.181 The DOJ did not adopt this recommendation,
however, because the regulatory scheme already “requires law
enforcement to make changes in policies that result in discriminatory
arrests or abuse of individuals with disabilities.”182 The regulation also
provides that “law enforcement personnel [are] required to make

175. See Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 428 (D. Md. 2014)
(refusing to accept the state’s argument that consideration in a training manual should be
dispositive).
176. While the court did not take issue with the title of the order, the title itself self-evidences
an absence of disability awareness. Saylor had Down syndrome, a developmental disability.
Developmental disabilities are categorically distinct from mental illness.
177. Saylor, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 427 n.10.
178. Id. at 427–28 (addressing the evidence presented and then noting that the language itself
does not per se “absolve[] its responsibility to develop a policy relating to those with
developmental disabilities”).
179. Id. at 427 (addressing the General Order presented and then noting, “[I]t would not
appear that the Deputies were trained to make any modification at all in their treatment of
individuals with developmental disabilities” and “[t]hey did not appear to have made any
adjustment in their response to Mr. Saylor”).
180. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473
(emphasis added).
181. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.130, at 686 (2016).
182. Id.
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appropriate efforts to determine whether perceived strange or
disruptive behavior or unconsciousness is the result of a disability.”183
Thus, the DOJ already interprets Title II and its regulations to include
police officer training. Like Congress, the DOJ acknowledged that full
compliance with the ADA requires effective police officer training. In
fact, the DOJ acted on this in a settlement agreement when it sought
police officer training that “ensure[s] that staff understand the legal
obligation . . . necessary to ensure effective communication with
qualified individuals with disabilities.”184 Therefore, insistence on
adequate disability training should be neither novel nor contentious.
B. The Prevalence and Substance of Disability Training Programs
The DOJ recognized the need for police training but also assumed
its ubiquity.185 However, comprehensive police officer training is far
from ubiquitous. Dating back to 1991, a presidential task force report
noted the “urgent need to greatly upgrade the training” of police on
how to interact with people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities.186 A few years later, one study asked all fifty states whether
the “state require[s] officers to complete training about individuals
with disabilities.”187 Researchers found that twelve states either had no
such training or had ambiguous training descriptions.188 Of the
remaining thirty-six states in the study,189 only four had a specific ADA
training program.190 Additionally, a mere four states included training
on intellectual disabilities, and only two had training on developmental
disabilities.191 As of 2010, only seven states had adopted the Uniform

183. Id.
184. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE WALLINGFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.ada.gov/
wallingford_sa.html [https://perma.cc/WLL3-P3HU].
185. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.130, at 686 (“The general regulatory obligation to modify
policies, practices, or procedures [already] requires law enforcement to make changes in
policies . . . .”).
186. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CITIZENS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 32 (1991).
187. See McAfee & Musso, supra note 52, at 57 (observing the prevalence, or lack thereof, of
police training programs that relate to individuals with disabilities across the United States).
188. Id. The study’s applicability may be limited given that it was conducted only five years
after the ADA’s enactment.
189. Two states did not participate in the study.
190. McAfee & Musso, supra note 187, at 60 tbl.3.
191. Id.
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Duties to Disabled Persons Act, a law requiring police officers to
determine whether someone is disabled prior to an arrest.192
Even the states with some disability training for police officers are
missing the mark. Sheehan and Saylor illustrate this point. The police
officers in both cases underwent basic disability training, but were still
unequipped to make on-the-scene modifications of arrest procedures
to avoid discrimination and death.193 That the officers received training
but still behaved as they did evidences the programs’ ineffectiveness.
Disabilities can be difficult to recognize, particularly if one’s
exposure is limited to a paper manual. Thus, comprehensive disability
training that requires interaction with, or videos depicting, individuals
with disabilities should be the preferred method. The DOJ does
provide training videos for police departments,194 but legislative action
would be best. An exemplary model comes from the state of Maryland
in honor of Ethan Saylor.
C. A Model for Disability Training: The Ethan Saylor Bill
In May 2015, Maryland passed the Ethan Saylor Bill.195 This law
takes an innovative approach to disability training for public
employees.196 Self-advocates, people with disabilities who volunteer to
educate others, are an integral component of Maryland’s new training
requirement.197 To date, Maryland is the only state to enact a law
mandating the incorporation of self-advocates in police officer
training.198 Affording law enforcement the opportunity to engage with
individuals with disabilities in a controlled and safe setting will help
foster effective communication before the presence of any potential
192. See DUKE CHEN, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
POLICE PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED
IN OTHER STATES (2010), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2010/rpt/2010-R-0324.htm [https://perma.cc/
EB8P-LWR5].
193. See supra notes 157−62, 175−77 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Respondent at
6–7, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1775 (2015) (No. 13-1412) (noting that the
officers’ behavior was contradictory to the relevant police policy received in training).
194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., Police Response to People with Disabilities,
ADA.GOV: INFO. AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON THE AMS. WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
http://www.ada.gov/policevideo/policebroadbandgallery.htm#Anchor-Part-48213 [https://perma.
cc/X2P6-8VPF] (last updated May 1, 2006).
195. Ethan Saylor Alliance for Self-Advocates as Educators, ch. 388, 2015 Md. Laws.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Debra Alfarone, Ethan Saylor Bill Signed in Maryland, WUSA 9 LOCAL
(May 13, 2015), http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/local/maryland/2015/05/12/ethan-saylor-billmd/27198967 [https://perma.cc/LG2N-JPXS].
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exigencies. When law enforcement officers are called to a scene
involving an individual with a disability, they will have tangible
experience to draw on rather than static advice from a training manual.
In May 2016, the Montgomery County police department held a
training event to bridge the communication gap and foster
understanding between the police and people with autism.199 As part of
this event, people with autism and their families were invited to tour
the police station, meet the police dogs, and see the vehicles and
equipment used by officers. In turn, police officers were encouraged to
learn and interact with the attendees. One participant, Gordy
Baylinson, a teenager with nonspeaking autism, was so moved by the
event that he wrote a letter to the police.200 He had heard “too many
tragic stories of [police] mistreatment and mishandling of autistics due
to lack of knowledge.”201 And so, Baylinson wrote, “[T]his letter
is . . . a cry for attention. With your attention, I can help you recognize
the signs of nonspeaking autism. If you can recognize the signs, then
you will be able to recognize our differences which then leads to
understanding . . . .”202
Training, like the event in Montgomery County, that includes
people with disabilities benefits not only the disability community but
the law enforcement community as well. “[Police] don’t enjoy having
to be . . . fearful or hostile in their approach. They see themselves [] as
the guardians of safety and harmony. They are appalled when faced
with the possibility of an inappropriate arrest caused by their having
too little understanding of a new situation.”203 Had the police officers
in Saylor and Sheehan been armed with adequate training and effective
communication skills, both cases may have ended peacefully rather
than tragically.

199. Jennifer Davis, Md. Teen Writes Letter to Police Providing Insight on Being NonSpeaking with Autism, FOX 5 LOCAL NEWS (May 20, 2016), http://www.fox5dc.com/news/localnews/143596753-story [https://perma.cc/J8P6-Y7W9].
200. Id.
201. Colby Itkowitz, This Nonspeaking Teenager Wrote an Incredibly Profound Letter
Explaining Autism, WASH. POST (May 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/inspiredlife/wp/2016/05/19/this-non-speaking-teen-wrote-an-incredibly-profound-letter-to-police-aboutautism [https://perma.cc/5YF7-SJVX].
202. Id.
203. Norley, supra note 48, at 25.
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CONCLUSION
The ADA was enacted to eradicate disability discrimination.
Knowing that miscommunication between law enforcement and
individuals with disabilities could lead to discrimination, Congress
intended that police officer activity be subject to ADA coverage, just
like all other public activities. Thus, law enforcement officers should
be required to comply with the ADA during arrests by reasonably
accommodating an individual’s disability, so long as that person is not
a direct threat to others. Comprehensive police officer training that
humanizes people with disabilities can enable officers to make accurate
individualized assessments about the level of threat posed and to
appropriately modify police procedures to best accommodate the
individual. Although society has come a long way in guaranteeing
equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities, the stories of Saylor
and Sheehan reflect a dangerous vulnerability in the ADA’s promise
of protection.

